Conclusion First: Risks are indeed accumulating, but it's more like "localized pressure release under high interest rates," not yet a systemic crisis like 2008.

In February 2026, there were 38,840 properties in the United States with foreclosure-related actions (including default notices, scheduled auctions, or bank repossessions), a year-on-year increase of 20%, marking the 12th consecutive month of year-on-year growth. In the same month, foreclosure starts reached 25,928 properties, up 14% year-on-year; completed foreclosures (REO) reached 4,077 properties, up 35% year-on-year.

These numbers indicate that "pressure points" in the U.S. real estate market are indeed re-accumulating, especially against the backdrop of persistently high interest rates, elevated home prices, significant monthly payment burdens, and financial fragility among some borrower groups.

However, if interpreted directly as "the U.S. housing market is about to collapse systemically," the evidence is currently insufficient. A more accurate understanding should be:

1. Foreclosures are normalizing from extremely low levels;
2. Localized vulnerable populations (especially high-risk loan groups) are under pressure;
3. Housing market risks are accumulating, but have not yet evolved into widespread, uncontrolled market conditions.

I. What does this 12-month rise in foreclosures actually mean?

First, it's important to clarify: an increase in foreclosure data does not mean all homeowners are defaulting on a large scale, nor does it mean home prices have already fallen across the board. It reflects a more specific process:

• Borrowers' repayment capacity is marginally weakening;
• Lenders are restarting collection processes;
• The market is transitioning from the post-pandemic "extremely low default" phase back to levels closer to historical norms.

ATTOM described this round of changes in the February 2026 data as "gradual normalization," which is crucial because it means:

• The current rise in foreclosures is more about recovering from abnormally low levels;
• It is not yet a crisis-driven foreclosure wave triggered by widespread negative equity, banking system issues, and broad unemployment.

Comparing February 2025 with February 2026 reveals a clear change:

• In February 2025, there were approximately 32,383 properties with foreclosure-related actions;
• In February 2026, this increased to 38,840 properties.

In other words, this is not just monthly noise but a trend that has persisted for a full year.

II. Why are foreclosures rising again?—High interest rates are not the only reason, but they are the core amplifier.

This round of foreclosure resurgence in the U.S. is driven by three underlying factors.

1) High interest rates are pushing up "monthly payment pressure" again.

A Reuters survey in March 2026 indicated that the U.S. 30-year mortgage rate is expected to remain around 6% in the coming years, and if geopolitical conflicts persist, it could even approach or rise toward 7%. This means:

• Affordability for new buyers continues to deteriorate;
• Homeowners with more fragile cash flows are more likely to face issues during income fluctuations;
• Refinancing options are limited, making it harder to alleviate pressure by swapping loans as easily as in the low-interest-rate era.

2) High home prices + high interest rates are causing affordability to deteriorate over the long term.

The same Reuters survey noted that while U.S. home prices are expected to rise moderately in 2026, with mortgage rates remaining high and affordability still tight, existing home sales are projected to stay below pre-2022 levels. In other words, the real estate market is not experiencing "strong demand" but is in a state of "high prices + high financing costs + low transaction efficiency."

3) Some loan groups are at higher risk, especially FHA loans.

ICE data from 2025 already highlighted that serious delinquencies were rising year-on-year, with almost all the increase coming from the FHA loan group. FHA borrowers typically have lower down payments and weaker resilience to shocks, making them more likely to be the first to encounter problems in the foreclosure chain amid high interest rates and rising living costs.

This means that the current real estate risk in the U.S. is not a "simultaneous market-wide crisis" but is first manifesting among borrowers with weaker financial resilience.

III. Does this mean the U.S. real estate market is repeating 2008?—Not yet, but there are a few areas to watch closely.

Such articles can easily become overly sensational. To maintain professionalism, AIAIG must clearly distinguish between "similarities" and "differences."

Similarities:

• Foreclosure numbers are rising again;
• Localized borrower default pressures are increasing;
• Market liquidity is declining, and buyer hesitation is intensifying.

Differences:

• U.S. homeowners overall still hold substantial home equity;
• Mortgage delinquency rates, while rising, remain significantly lower than during the financial crisis;
• Housing supply is still insufficient, unlike the oversupply before 2008;
• The banking system and loan underwriting standards are generally stricter, with better leverage quality than before the subprime crisis.

NAR's public statement at the end of 2025 also emphasized that although foreclosures are increasing, mortgage delinquencies overall remain near historical lows, homeowners have high equity, and the fundamental conditions do not yet signal a full-blown crisis.

Therefore, a more accurate statement is not "2008 is coming back," but:

The U.S. real estate market is transitioning from an 'era of extremely low risk' back to an 'era where risks are being repriced by the market.'

4. Which States and Cities Should Be More Vigilant? – U.S. Real Estate Risks Are Not Nationwide Averages, But Regional Divergence

ATTOM's state-level data indicates that the rise in foreclosures is not occurring uniformly but is highly differentiated. Areas that typically require close attention include:

• Regions where affordability is deteriorating rapidly;
• Markets with a higher proportion of high-risk loans such as FHA;
• Areas where home price increases were once too rapid and now transaction volumes are weakening;
• Secondary cities with insufficient support from employment and population inflows.

Similarly, CoreLogic pointed out in early 2025 that nearly 80% of U.S. metropolitan areas experienced an overall increase in delinquency rates, with about 35% seeing a significant rise in severe delinquencies. This suggests that risks are not isolated points but have already begun to spread to a broader regional level.

However, "spread" does not mean "synchronous collapse." If AIAIG intends to continue with series content, the most suitable extension methods are:

• Create an article titled "U.S. Foreclosure Risk State Map (2026)";
• Create an article titled "FHA Loan Stress and Vulnerable Areas in the U.S. Real Estate Market";
• Create an article titled "Which U.S. Cities Are More Likely to Transition from High Interest Rates to Rising Foreclosures?".

This approach would be more professional than a single article like "U.S. Housing Market Is About to Collapse" and easier to generate thematic traffic.

5. What Truly Matters for Investors Is Not the Foreclosure Headline Itself, But These 4 Subsequent Variables

If you want to assess whether U.S. real estate risks are truly escalating, the following four indicators are most worth monitoring next:

1) Whether Severe Delinquencies (90+ Days) Continue to Expand

Foreclosures are just the outcome; severe delinquencies are a more leading pressure indicator.

2) Whether Stress from FHA and Low-Down-Payment Loan Groups Spills Over to Broader Borrowers

If risks extend from "vulnerable groups" to "ordinary mortgage borrowers," market signals will significantly worsen.

3) Whether Listing Cycles and Discounted Transactions Increase Significantly

Once properties become unsellable or can only be sold at reduced prices, foreclosures are more likely to evolve from localized issues into price problems.

4) Whether Unemployment Rates and Income Sides Deteriorate

The true trigger for a real estate crisis escalation is often not just high interest rates, but the simultaneous occurrence of "high interest rates + weakening employment."

Therefore, while 12 consecutive months of rising foreclosures are indeed cause for vigilance, to truly determine whether "risks are re-accumulating into a cycle," it is essential to see if these variables are deteriorating simultaneously.

6. AIAIG's More Professional Expression: U.S. Real Estate Is Not a "Collapse Narrative," But a "Pressure Repricing"

If this article is used for AIAIG publication, the most suitable core conclusion should be:

• The current U.S. real estate market is not suitable for being described as a "comprehensive crisis";
• Nor should it be downplayed as "completely fine";
• A more accurate expression is:

U.S. real estate risks are re-accumulating from extremely low levels, but this resembles structural pressure in a high-interest-rate environment rather than systemic loss of control.

For readers, this is more valuable than simple panic headlines. Because what truly matters is not "foreclosures are rising," but:

• Which types of borrowers are experiencing issues first;
• Which regions are more vulnerable;
• How long high interest rates will persist;
• Whether prices will be forced to adjust due to declining liquidity.

This is the real risk mainline worth monitoring for U.S. real estate in 2026.